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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3609
___________
KEITH DUNKLEY,
Appellant
v.
MELLON INVESTOR SERVICES;
VOLT MANAGEMENT CORP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-03501)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 19, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 4, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Keith Dunkley, proceeding pro se, appeals two District Court orders which
denied his motions to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act
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(“FAA”) and his subsequent motions to reconsider. He has also filed a motion for
appointment of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the orders of the
District Court and deny Dunkley’s motion for appointment of counsel.
I.
In 2004, Dunkley was employed by Volt Management, a staffing agency
providing clients with temporary workers. As a condition of his employment at Volt,
Dunkley signed an employment agreement which contained a binding arbitration clause.
In November 2004, Dunkley was assigned to work at Mellon Investment Services in New
Jersey, and he worked there for several months.
In 2005, Dunkley sent an e-mail to a coworker, complaining that a third
male coworker had left a piece of candy on Dunkley’s desk as a sexual overture, which
Dunkley stated was unwelcome. The next day, Mellon terminated Dunkley’s work
assignment, alleging “e-mail abuse,” without specifying what constituted the abuse. Volt
then terminated Dunkley’s employment.
Following his termination, Dunkley filed a discrimination charge with the
EEOC. In June 2006, the EEOC dismissed Dunkley’s complaint and issued a right-to-sue
letter. Dunkley then filed a complaint in the District Court. In response, the Defendants
filed joint motions to dismiss the complaint and/or compel Dunkley to submit to binding
arbitration, as required by his contract with Volt. The District Court granted the motion
to compel arbitration.
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Dunkley then filed two separate demands for arbitration with the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”), alleging wrongful termination, discrimination, sexual
advance, and defamation. The AAA selected Stephen Ruffino to serve as Arbitrator.
Dunkley filed several objections based on Ruffino’s disclosure statement, which showed
that one of Ruffino’s former law partners had once worked in an unrelated capacity for
Bank of New York, which later merged with Mellon. Because this disclosure established
no actual or apparent conflict of interest, the AAA confirmed Ruffino’s appointment.
In March 2008, the Arbitrator convened a hearing in which the parties were
permitted to call witnesses and submit evidence. After considering the merits of
Dunkley’s claims, the Arbitrator found Dunkley to be credible, but reasoned that he had
failed to show either a violation of Title VII or that he had been defamed. The Arbitrator
billed all costs associated with the hearing to Mellon and Volt, and ordered them to each
pay Dunkley $75 to compensate him for his filing fees.
Following the Arbitrator’s award decision, Dunkley filed in the District
Court two documents that were styled as “motions to reopen,” but which essentially asked
the District Court to vacate the Arbitrator’s decision and consider his claims on the
merits. (Dist. Ct. Doc. Nos. 24 & 28). In response, the Defendants filed a motion asking
the District Court to confirm the arbitration award. In one order, the District Court denied
both of Dunkley’s motions and granted the request to confirm the arbitration award.
(Doc. No. 33). Dunkley then filed a timely motion to reconsider, followed by a
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supplemental motion to reconsider. (Doc. Nos. 36 & 38). The District Court denied both
motions. (Doc. No. 42). Dunkley filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review questions of
law that support the confirmation of an arbitration award de novo, but will accept the
District Court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-48 (1995). We review the denial of
Dunkley’s motions to reconsider for abuse of discretion. See Caver v. Trenton, 420 F.3d
243, 258 (3d Cir. 2005).
We agree with the District Court that Dunkley failed to demonstrate that the
Arbitrator’s award should be vacated. Under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10:
(a) [A district court] may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration - (1) where the award was produced by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in . . .
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy . . . ; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
However, the party seeking to overturn an award bears a heavy burden, as these are
“exceedingly narrow circumstances,” Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir.
2003), and courts accord arbitration decisions exceptional deference. See id. In his two
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“motions to reopen,” Dunkley argued that the Arbitrator was biased in favor of the
Defendants, and generally expressed disagreement with the Arbitrator’s reasoning. The
District Court reasoned that, under the FAA’s narrow, deferential standard, the
Arbitrator’s past tenuous relationship to Bank of New York was insufficient to satisfy
Dunkley’s burden of demonstrating “evident partiality or corruption” on the part of the
Arbitrator. We agree. The District Court properly determined that Dunkley’s mere
disagreement with the Arbitrator’s reasoning did not provide a basis to disturb the award.
See United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 379 (3d
Cir. 1995) (“A court may not overrule an arbitrator simply because it disagrees with the
arbitrator’s” resolution of a claim) (quoting News America Publ’ns, Inc. v. Newark
Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Next, we turn to Dunkley’s motions for reconsideration. To prevail on a
motion for reconsideration, a litigant must demonstrate: “(1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence . . .; or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. LouAnn, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). “A motion for reconsideration
cannot be used to ‘relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could
have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555
F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, Fla.,
408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)). In his motions to reconsider, which contained
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virtually identical arguments, Dunkley further explained his reasons for opposing the
Arbitrator’s decision. Citing the above-quoted provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), Dunkley
asserted that the Arbitrator (1) demonstrated bias in accepting as true the testimony of
Mellon’s witness, and (2) acted in excess of his power and committed misconduct by
refusing to allow Dunkley’s witness to testify. We agree with the District Court that
Dunkley failed to present new evidence or demonstrate that the District Court overlooked
relevant facts or law. The arguments in Dunkley’s motions to reconsider either were
already raised and addressed when the District Court considered his request to vacate the
arbitration award, or could have been raised in those filings.
Accordingly, we will affirm the orders of the District Court. Dunkley’s
motion for appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d
Cir. 1993).
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